The following notes would try to target the problem of "independence" from the point of view of social sciences, rather than from the narrower political point of view. In modern Tunisia nothing was and is still fragile than the Tunisians’ belief in the state nation of "TUNISIA". At the opposite of what many may think, the territorial unity of Tunisia, which was generally strong and easy to defend, does not lead mechanically to a strong belief in the integrity of the state nation, as an independent entity.

The symptoms of such fragility are the following:

  The very easy integration of Tunisians in non tunisian contexts, especially the western one. The hybridity of Tunisians is very high and can be very remarquable when compared to other arab citizens like the Algerians. Tunisians in Europe and the US are certainly more exposed to the current of re-nationalization: that is the tendency to easily embrace another citinship. While many think that this is just a formal "change" taht does not touch the integral belief of these "new citizens" in their "Tunisianship", it is clear that their process of cultural dislocation is much easier, and quicker.

  While it was helpful to defend the territorial unity by not having a very complicated topographic context, the population living around the "borders" of the state nation are very vulnerable. In fact, they are constantly exposed to a very quick change towards the other part of the borders, the moment they feel the economic need to "stop being Tunisians". This phenomenon can be seen through the 1980 s and before in the southeast (in relation to Lybia) and just lately in the northwest (in realtion to Algeria). The seemengly funny phenomenon of the soccer funs of Gafsa, who use to raise the Algerian flag whenever they think they lost unjustly, is very telling in the longue duree. Briefly our borders are much more fragile than anyone of our neighbours.